In Defence of Culture? Racialised Sexual Violence and Agency in Legal and Judicial Narratives by Dagistanli, Selda
www.crimejusticejournal.com	IJCJ&SD	2015	4(3):	57‐72	 	ISSN	2202–8005	
		
©	The	Author(s)	2015	
In	Defence	of	Culture?	Racialised	Sexual	Violence	and	Agency	
in	Legal	and	Judicial	Narratives	
Selda	Dagistanli	
University	of	Western	Sydney,	Australia	
	
	
	
Abstract	
There	 is	 a	 rich	 body	 of	 work	 in	 critical	 race	 and	 feminist	 theories	 that	 have	 criticised	 as	
Euro/Anglo‐centric,	and	hence	exclusionary,	 the	 liberal	 foundations	of	Western	democratic	
legal	systems.	The	basis	of	such	critiques	is	that	legal	personhood	is	premised	on	an	atomistic	
individual	 agent	 that	 purports	 to	 be	 neutral	 but	 in	 actuality	 reflects	 and	 maintains	 the	
hegemonic	gendered	and	raced	status	quo	privileging	the	white,	middle	to	upper‐class	man	
to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 women	 and	 all	 racial	 and	 cultural	 Others.	 Some	 approaches,	 such	 as	
cultural	 defences	 in	 criminal	 law,	 have	 sought	 to	 address	 this	 via	 a	 recognition	 and	
incorporation	of	the	difference	of	Other	groups	and	their	different	moral	norms,	proclivities	
and	 circumstances.	 To	 illustrate,	 this	 discussion	 will	 draw	 on	 a	 cultural	 defence	 that	 was	
advanced	 in	 a	 series	 of	 group	 sexual	 violence	 cases	 that	 involved	 four	 Pakistani,	 Muslim	
brothers.	While	concluding	that	culture	permeates	the	actions	of	all	 individuals,	 this	article	
seeks	 to	 show	 how	 cultural	 recognition	 approaches	 in	 law	 often	 overlook	 the	 individual	
agency	of	 those	differentiated	through	their	racial,	ethnic	and	religious	visibility.	Instead	of	
asserting	 the	 primacy	 of	 individual	 free	 will	 and	 a	 rational	 agent	 as	 the	 main	 driver	 of	
criminal	behaviour	cultural	defences,	in	particular,	appear	to	attribute	criminal	action	to	the	
morally	 aberrant	 traditions	 and	 practices	 of	 non‐Western	 cultures.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 such	
approaches	to	cultural	recognition	fail	to	acknowledge	that	culture,	and	not	just	the	culture	of	
Others,	is	necessarily	the	backdrop	for	all	(group)	sexual	violence.	With	these	points	in	mind,	
the	paper	ends	with	some	suggestions	for	accommodating	alternative	narratives	that	seek	to	
avoid	the	reductive	scripts	that	currently	appear	to	characterise	legal	and	judicial	musings	on	
culture.	
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Introduction	
The	current	discussion	reflects	on	the	ways	in	which	the	notoriously	slippery	concept	of	culture,	
as	exemplified	through	cultural	defence,	has	been	mobilised	in	some	racialised	sexual	violence	
cases	in	Australia.	Empirically,	this	article	focuses	on	the	highly	publicised	Sydney	trials	of	four	
Pakistani	immigrant	Muslim	brothers,	the	‘K	brothers’,	who	perpetrated	a	series	of	aggravated	
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group	sexual	assaults	on	several	young	women	throughout	2002.	Concentrating	on	the	issues	of	
culture	 raised	 throughout	 the	 brothers’	 trials,	 and	 a	 cultural	 defence	 raised	 in	 a	 sentencing	
appeal	for	the	ringleader,	this	discussion	contends	that	an	Anglo	or	Euro‐centric	legal	system’s	
understanding	 of	 Other	 cultures	 represents	 a	 departure	 from	 its	 liberal	 philosophical	
underpinnings	 that	 are	 founded	 on	 individualism,	 free	 will,	 and	 rationality	 –	 the	 tenets	 of	
liberalism	 that	 have	 long	 been	 critiqued	 by	 feminists	 and	 critical	 race	 theorists	 as	 highly	
gendered	 and	 racialised	 despite	 being	 posited	 as	 neutral	 (see	 Delgado	 and	 Stefancic	 2000;	
Naffine	 1987;	 1990;	 Razack	 1999;	 Threadgold	 1991).	 By	 drawing	 on	 the	 insights	 of	 critical	
theory,	this	paper	argues	that	liberalism’s	central	tenet	of	the	individual	free	agent	seems	to	be	
superseded	 by	 law’s	 invocations	 of	 Other	 cultures,	 becoming	 markedly	 lost	 within	 cultural	
defence	arguments	in	criminal	law	(Volpp	2001).	Instead	of	asserting	the	primacy	of	individual	
free	 will	 and	 a	 rational	 volitional	 subject	 as	 the	 main	 driver	 of	 criminal	 behaviour,	 cultural	
defence	 takes	 a	 view	 of	 criminal	 actions	 as	 largely	 determined	 by	 the	 morally	 aberrant	
traditions	and	practices	of	non‐Western	cultures.		
	
More	broadly,	following	Razack	(1994;	1999),	this	paper	maintains	that	‘culture	talk’	in	law	and	
politics	traverses	some	treacherous	ground.	While	recognitions	of	difference	and	the	relevance	
of	 culture	 might	 be	 advanced	 in	 adversarial	 legal	 frameworks	 with	 progressive	 intent,	 such	
‘recognitions’,	 if	 they	 may	 be	 so	 accurately	 called,	 are	 plagued	 with	 political	 and	 ethical	
ambivalence.	Though	they	seek	to	acknowledge	diverse	moral	frameworks	which	may	influence	
or	constrain	the	actions	of	individuals	–	frameworks	presumed	to	be	fundamentally	different	to	
the	dominant	normative	context	within	which	the	law	operates	–	cultural	defences	often	fail	to	
move	 beyond	 the	 reductive	 and	 objectifying	 projects	 of	 colonialism	 and	 conservative	 politics	
which	presuppose	the	moral	superiority	of	hegemonic	Western	cultures	(Narayan	1998,	2000).	
Indeed,	when	 the	 culture	of	Others	 is	 deployed	as	part	of	 an	 explanation	or	 as	mitigation	 for	
abhorrent	 criminal	 acts,	 ‘culture	 talk’	 functions	 to	 racialise	 (or	 ‘culturalise’)	 such	 acts	 while	
criminalising	certain	cultural	groups	(Humphrey	2007:	14).		
	
Through	application	to	the	crimes	of	ethnic	and	religious	Others,	cultural	defences	are	premised	
on	 representations	 of	 Others	 as	 bound	 to	 the	 dictates	 of	 backward	 and	 intransigent	 cultural	
practices.	 As	 seen	 in	 the	 case	 study	 on	 which	 this	 paper	 focuses,	 sexual	 violence	 cases	 also	
promulgate	 a	 concept	 of	 cultural	 conditioning	 as	 specifically	 gendered,	 only	 giving	 voice	 to	
patriarchal	understandings	as	delivering	the	truly	authentic	notions	of	cultural	tradition	whilst	
eliding	voices	that	offer	alternative	cultural	narratives	that	oppose	and	challenge	the	patriarchal	
status	quo	(Narayan	2000;	Phillips	2003,	2007;	Razack	1994,	1999).	A	similar	phenomenon	can	
be	 observed	 in	 post‐colonial	 legal	 discourses	 that	 seek	 to	 mitigate	 the	 sexual	 violence	 of	
Aboriginal	men	in	Australia	(Cripps	and	Taylor	2009;	Howe	2009)	and	elsewhere	(see	Razack	
1994	for	a	Canadian	example).1	By	apportioning	responsibility	to	culture	and	the	cultural	group	
that	gives	 life	to	certain	traditions	and	practices,	cultural	defences	deny	agency,	responsibility	
and	the	individual	subjectivity	that	might	be	afforded	to	accused	persons	who	are	identified	as	
culturally	different.		
	
Meanwhile,	 cultural	 defence,	 by	 differentiating	 itself	 from	 other	 criminal	 defences,	 remains	
resoundingly	silent	on	the	everyday	cultural	practices	of	individuals	who	are	identified	as	part	
of	the	dominant	cultural	framework.	By	so	doing,	the	cultural	defence	fails	to	acknowledge	that	
most	criminal	defences	or	character	assessments,	aside	from	those	citing	reduced	capacity	due	
to	 age	 or	mental	 illness,	 are	 in	 effect	 cultural.	 Examples	may	 be	 found	 in	 legal	 scripts	where	
accused	persons	are	attributed	positive	character	traits	such	as	achievements	in	education	and	
professional	life	(such	as	an	example	of	educational	achievement	under	adverse	circumstances	
as	 cited	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 youngest	 of	 the	 K	 brothers)	 or	 are	 generally	 and	 generically	
represented	 as	 law‐abiding	 citizens	 who	 are	 devoted	 to	 their	 families.	 Such	 normative	
representations	are	implicitly	racialised	through	their	silent	attribution	to	the	dominant	Anglo	
or	Euro‐centric	majority	culture	that	is	reflected	by	law.		
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The	numerous	criminal	trials	for	the	offences	of	four	Pakistani	immigrant	Muslim	brothers,	the	
‘K	brothers’,	 illustrate	some	of	these	issues.	The	K	brothers	perpetrated	a	series	of	aggravated	
group	 sexual	 assaults	 on	 several	 young	 women	 throughout	 2002	 and	 were	 reported	 by	
mainstream	media	to	exclusively	attack	young	white	Australian	women.	The	theme	of	racialised	
sexual	 assault	 echoed	popular	 and	political	discourse	 around	 the	 cases,	 trials	 and	 sentencing,	
between	 2000	 and	 2006,	 for	 a	 series	 of	 other	 group	 sexual	 assaults	 involving	 two	 separate	
groups	 of	 young	 Lebanese	 Muslim	 perpetrators	 who	 were	 also	 seen	 to	 target	 young	 white	
Australian	 women.	 Popularly	 labeled	 as	 the	 ‘Sydney	 gang	 rapes’,	 the	 trilogy	 of	 group	 sexual	
assault	 cases	 included	 AEM	 and	 Others,	 Bilal	 Skaf	 and	 his	 cohorts,	 and	 ended	 with	 the	 K	
brothers’	attacks.	These	other	cases	comprised	part	of	the	general	social	and	political	backdrop	
in	 which	 the	 K	 brothers’	 trials	 took	 place.	 These	 incidences	 of	 group	 sexual	 violence	 were	
ubiquitously	racialised	in	public	discourse	–	with	Middle	Eastern	Muslim	men	attacking	white	
Australian	women	 –	 and	 it	was	widely	 held	 that	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 offenders	were	 driven	 by	
their	cultural	backgrounds	that	were	conflated,	in	popular	political	discourse,	with	their	ethnic	
and	religious	affiliations	(Poynting	et	al.	2004).	As	such,	the	crimes	were	represented	in	some	
quarters	as	‘race	hate’	crimes,	with	public	and	political	calls	for	more	severe	punishment	(Johns	
et	al.	2001).		
	
Despite	 the	 political	 racket,	 legal	 discourses	 around	 the	 cultural	 backgrounds	 of	 the	
perpetrators	in	all	three	cases	were	typically	subdued	on	the	issue	of	race,	ethnicity	and	culture	
(terms	 interchangeably	 used),	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 the	 K	 brothers’	 trials	 where	 the	 most	
striking	and	problematic	 references	 to	 culture	 emerged	 in	 the	 form	of	 a	 cultural	 defence	 in	 a	
sentencing	appeal	that	sought	to	explain	the	ringleader’s	violent	misogyny	through	reference	to	
his	 cultural	 background.	 In	 fact,	 cultural	 defences	 used	 to	 mitigate	 gendered	 violence	 are	
unremarkable	and	have	featured	in	American	(Okin	1999;	Renteln	2004;	Volpp	2001),	English	
(Phillips	 2003)	 and	 Australian	 courts	 (Maher	 et	 al.	 2005),	 particularly	 with	 reference	 to	
provocation	 cases	where	men	 have	 killed	 their	 estranged	 or	 unfaithful	 partners.	 Yet	 all	 have	
been	 fraught	 with	 the	 same	 issues	 of	 cultural	 essentialism	 and,	 in	 some	 cases,	 the	 morally	
undesirable	outcome	of	asserting	the	primacy	of	‘cultural	rights’	(reductively	understood)	over	
women’s	rights	(Phillips	2002,	2003,	2007).	
	
The	paper	proceeds	with	an	overview	of	the	K	brothers’	cases	with	a	detailed	consideration	of	
those	passages	in	sentencing	judgments	and	commentary	within	the	courtroom	and	other	legal	
documents,	which	 engage	with	 the	 concept	 of	 culture.	 Concluding	 that	 culture	permeates	 the	
actions	of	all	 individuals	–	along	with	 the	structural	circumstances	 in	which	cultural	practices	
and	 individual	 choices	 are	 realised	 –	 this	 discussion	 ultimately	 seeks	 to	 show	 how	 cultural	
recognition	 approaches	 in	 law	 often	 overlook	 the	 individual	 agency	 and	 subjectivity	 of	 those	
differentiated	through	their	racial,	ethnic	and	religious	visibility,	while	simultaneously	failing	to	
acknowledge	that	culture	is	the	backdrop	for	all	(group)	sexual	violence.	The	paper	ends	with	
some	suggestions	for	accommodating	alternative	narratives	that	aim	to	avoid	the	reductive	and	
essentialist	scripts	 that	currently	appear	 to	characterise	 legal	and	 judicial	musings	on	culture.	
These	suggestions	do	not	preclude	recognition	of	the	fact	that	sexual	violence	and	generalised	
misogyny	 is	 indeed	a	distinctly	 cultural	problem	among	men	acting	 in	groups	within	different	
social	 and	 institutional	 contexts	 and	 that	 gendered	 violence	 is	 not	 strictly	 the	 preserve	 of	
ethnically,	religiously	and	racially	marked	Others.	
	
The	K	brothers	
In	2003,	four	brothers	identifying	as	Pakistani	Muslim	immigrants	were	tried	and	convicted	of	
three	 separate	 group	 sexual	 assaults	 perpetrated	 on	 four	 young	 women.2	 This	 group	 of	
offenders	 came	 to	 be	 known	 as	 the	 ‘K	 brothers’:	 their	 names	 were	 subject	 to	 a	 media	
suppression	order	because	two	of	the	brothers	and	all	of	the	victims	were	juveniles	at	the	time	
of	the	attacks.	A	fifth	man,	RS,	an	international	student	from	Nepal	was	unrelated	to	the	others	
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and	committed	suicide	 in	custody	before	he	could	be	sentenced	(Regina	v	MSK,	Regina	v	MAK,	
Regina	v	MRK,	Regina	v	MMK	[2004]	NSWSC	319	at	11).	
	
The	 attacks	 occurred	 in	 a	 unit	 in	 a	 Sydney	 suburb	 over	 a	 six‐month	 period	 during	 2002,	
involving	considerable	violence	and	threats	with	offensive	weapons.	During	the	trials	for	these	
rapes,	the	court	heard	that	the	four	brothers	and	RS	often	befriended	a	number	of	young	women	
in	 a	 variety	 of	 different	 situations	 and,	 after	 becoming	 acquainted,	 would	 invite	 the	 young	
women	over	for	a	‘party’	which	ended	in	group	sexual	violence.	The	victims	were	as	young	as	13	
years	of	age	and	the	eldest	brother,	clearly	recognised	as	the	ringleader,	threatened	to	kill	them	
and	used	weapons,	physical	violence	and	psychological	taunts	to	intimidate	them	if	they	did	not	
sexually	submit.	After	being	sexually	assaulted,	the	girls	were	usually	abandoned,	late	at	night,	
in	suburban	streets	and	warned	not	to	tell	anyone	about	the	events.		
	
The	trials	became	infamous	for	the	decision	of	the	oldest	two	K	brothers,	MSK	and	MAK,	to	sack	
their	 barristers	 for	 the	 first	 few	 trials,	 and	 steadfastly	 refuse	 legal	 representation	 while	
expressing	a	preference	 to	 represent	 themselves.	Their	 reasoning	was	based	on	 the	brothers’	
allegations	 that	 the	 Australian	 government,	 police,	 and	 the	 courts	 were	 complicit	 in	 an	 anti‐
Muslim	 conspiracy	 against	 them.	 MSK	 specifically	 accused	 their	 barrister	 of	 saying	 that	 ‘all	
Muslims	 are	 rapists’	 and	 that	 they	 were	 subsequently	 forced	 to	 sack	 him.	 The	 brothers’	
allegations	were	followed	by	a	sensational	sequence	of	events	in	court,	owing	to	the	outlandish	
and	 unchecked	 courtroom	 behaviour	 of	 the	 self‐represented	 accused,	 led	 by	 MSK,	 which	
resulted	in	stays	to	the	legal	process,	aborted	trials,	retrials	and	numerous	appeals.		
	
The	 oldest	 brothers’	 courtroom	 histrionics	 occurred	 in	 the	 two	 separate	 trials	 conducted	 for	
three	 separate	 attacks:	 one	 for	 the	 first	 two	 victims	 that	 came	 forward,	 LS	 and	 HG	 (whose	
names	were	subject	to	a	media	suppression	order),	before	Justice	Brian	Sully;	and	another	for	
the	 second	 two	 victims	 (who	 famously	 waived	 their	 right	 to	 anonymity,	 Tegan	Wagner	 and	
Cassie	Hamim),	before	Justice	Hidden	some	three	years	later.	The	well‐publicised	delay	tactics	
prior	 to	and	during	 the	trials	 for	 the	cases	of	Tegan	Wagner	and	Cassie	Hamim	included	MSK	
feigning	mental	illness,	where	he	claimed	to	have	auditory	hallucinations	in	which	the	voice	of	
Satan	prompted	him	to	do	bad	things	such	as	sexually	abuse	young	women;	MSK	announcing	to	
the	jury	that	they	had	already	been	previously	convicted	and	sentenced	of	gang	rape	and	forcing	
a	mistrial;	threatening	and	actually	attempting	to	physically	attack	members	of	the	Prosecution	
team;	throwing	a	glass	of	water	at	the	Judge’s	bench	and	broken	glass	at	the	victims’	mothers;	
and	 throwing	pears	 at	 the	 jury.	 It	was	MSK’s	 behaviour	 in	 particular	 that	 ensured	 that	 the	K	
brothers’	trials	took	over	three	years	to	conclude	from	the	first	trials	(in	2003)	to	the	end	of	the	
second	(in	2006).		
	
Perhaps	 the	 allegations	 of	 racism	 and	 the	 brothers’	 dramatic	 displays	 in	 court	 provided	
foundations	 for	 the	 distinctly	 cultural	 overtones	 of	 public	 narratives	 that	 racialised	 the	 K	
brothers’	courtroom	misbehaviour,	providing	some	credibility	to	 ideas	that	they	obeyed	 ‘alien	
moral	 codes’	 (Dagistanli	 2007:	187).	Aside	 from	 the	well‐publicised	 failure	of	 the	brothers	 to	
respect	the	majesty	of	the	court,	the	two	oldest	brothers’	insistence	on	representing	themselves	
had	established	them	as	independent	courtroom	agents,	alongside	their	family	members	upon	
whom	the	brothers	relied	as	witnesses	and	alibis.	The	independence	of	the	K	family	from	other	
legal	 actors	 empowered	 them	 to	 advance	 extremely	 problematic	 and	 highly	 gendered	 and	
racialised	understandings	of	their	cultural	background.	Yet,	despite	their	cultural	difference,	the	
K	family’s	pronouncements	on	their	own	cultural	background	exhibited	striking	similarities	to	
some	of	 the	 legal	and	anthropological	understandings	of	 culture	(and	gendered	victimisation)	
that	were	invoked	in	this	case.	Notable	examples	are	found	in	the	public	commentary	of	the	K	
brothers’	father,	Dr	K	(then	a	local	GP),	supporting	his	sons’	allegations	of	racism	by	providing	
false	alibis	and	blaming	the	victims	for	being	sexually	assaulted.	In	one	comment	outside	court	
Dr	K	said	to	the	media:	‘You	are	the	enemy.	You	are	the	enemy	of	the	Muslim.	You	white	people	
help	 only	 the	 white	 people	 …	 they	 are	 not	 rapists’	 (Devine	 2005).	 In	 another,	 he	 remarked:	
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‘What	do	they	[the	victims]	expect	to	happen	to	them?	Girls	from	Pakistan	don’t	go	out	at	night’,	
before	asserting	that	his	sons	‘did	not	know	the	laws	of	this	country’	(Sheehan	2006a).		
	
Comments	 such	as	 these	echoed	 the	 sharp	division	 that	had	been	constructed	along	 religious	
and	 racial	 lines,	 particularly	with	 popular	 political	 discourse	 around	 the	 preceding	 racialised	
gang	 rape	 cases,	 between	Western	 culture	 (invisible	 in	 its	 hegemony)	 and	 Muslim	 minority	
cultures.	Indeed,	the	sentiment	outside	the	rarefied	space	of	the	courtroom	could	be	summed	up	
in	 a	 remark	made	 by	Paul	 Sheehan,	 a	 conservative	 journalist	who	wrote	prolifically	 on	 the	K	
brothers’	cases	and	the	court	process:	 ‘the	crimes	took	place	against	the	backdrop	of	a	violent	
cultural	clash	between	young	Muslim	men	and	young	Western	women’	(Sheehan	2006b).		
	
Such	 cultural	 schisms	 constructed	 in	 popular	 narratives	 outside	 the	 courtroom,	 and	by	 the	K	
family	 themselves,	 were	 reinforced	 within	 the	 courtroom	 by	 an	 intersection	 of	 legal,	
anthropological,	 psychological	 and	 medical	 discourses	 that	 sought	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 K	
brothers’	 attacks.	 The	 most	 obvious	 example	 was	 a	 cultural	 defence	 argument	 advanced	 on	
behalf	of	MSK	by	his	counsel	Stephen	Odgers	–	when	the	two	older	brothers	decided	to	obtain	
legal	representation	in	the	trials	before	Justice	Peter	Hidden	–	as	a	potentially	mitigating	factor	
in	sentencing.	In	the	defence,	MSK	notoriously	came	to	be	known,	in	Stephen	Odgers’	words,	as	
a	 ‘cultural	 time	 bomb’	 waiting	 to	 explode	 (Odgers	 2005).	 Drawing	 on	 independent	
anthropological	 research	 conducted	 in	 MSK’s	 birthplace,	 Odgers	 claimed	 that	 it	 was	 only	 a	
matter	of	time	before	MSK’s	cultural	conditioning	drove	him	to	commit	deplorable	acts	of	sexual	
violence	against	women	in	Australia.	The	cultural	defence	was	also	invoked	at	an	earlier	date	in	
an	appeal	before	the	New	South	Wales	Court	of	Criminal	Appeal	(NSWCCA)	against	the	severity	
of	 the	 sentences	 handed	 down	 by	 Justice	 Brian	 Sully	 in	 the	 earlier	 trial	 for	 the	 K	 brothers’	
attacks	on	LS	and	HG.		
	
The	 defence	 was	 supported	 by	 an	 expert	 witness,	 Professor	 Michael	 Humphrey,	 who	 had	
researched	the	tribal	culture	of	North	West	Frontier	Pakistan	(NWFP),	an	anomic	space	at	the	
border	 of	 Afghanistan	 that	 is	 marked	 by	 poverty	 and	 conflict	 (Abbas	 2014),	 where	 the	 K	
brothers	were	 born	and	lived	 for	most	 of	 their	lives	(Odgers	2005).	Aspects	of	the	culture	that	
Humphrey	described	were	that:	
	
[It	 is]	 a	 tribal	 culture	 with	 strong	 patriarchal	 values	 and	 an	 honour	 code	
enforced	 by	personal	violence	 …	 Men	 have	 control	 over	 women	 in	 all	 areas	
of	 their	 lives;	 men’s	 authority	 over	women	 is	 reinforced	 by	 the	 legal	 system	
[and]	rape	is	a	crime	that	 is	prosecuted	rarely.	(Odgers	2005:	6)	
	
Elsewhere,	Odgers	quoted	Humphrey’s	arguments	 that	 the	 factual	 circumstances	 in	which	 the	
offender	 found	 himself	would,	 in	 NWFP	 ‘almost	 certainly	 be	 found	 in	 a	 brothel’	 and	 that	 the	
‘proposition	 that	 a	 girl	 in	 this	 situation	 could	 take	 control	 by	 asserting	 her	 rights	 –	 i.e.	
saying	 no	 –	 would	 be	 very	 difficult	 in	 a	patriarchal	tribal	culture	where	women	are	treated	
as	dependants	and	legal	minors’	(2005:	7).	 	
	
In	sum,	the	substance	 of	 the	 submissions	 were	 that	 the	 offender	 ‘ by	 reason	 of	 this	cultural	
background,	 did	 not	 appreciate,	 or	 did	 not	 fully	 appreciate,	 the	 wrongness	 and	criminality	
of	 his	 actions’,	 and	 that	 this,	 to	 an	 extent,	 diminished	 the	 culpability	 of	 the	accused	 (Odgers	
2005:	6).	These	statements	were	enthusiastically	supported	by	MSK	himself:		
	
[TW]	 said	 no	 but	 I	 go	 ahead	 with	 it	 because	 I	 believe	 that	 at	 the	 time	 I	
commit	 these	offences,	 I	 believe	 that	 she	 was	 promiscuous	…	 She	 don't	 know	
us,	 I	 don't	 know	 her	 …	 she	 was	 not	 wearing	 any	 headscarf	 and	 she	 started	
drinking	with	us	 and	she	 was	 singing	…	 I	believe	 at	 the	 time	 when	 I	 commit	
these	offences	 that	 she	had	no	right	to	say	no.	(Wallace	2005:	5)	
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These	arguments	around	culture	and	cultural	conditioning	came	to	contribute	to	the	persistent	
racialisation	 of	 sexual	 assault	 at	 the	 time,	 even	 though	 they	 were	 advanced	 with	 what	 was	
presumably	 the	politically	 progressive	 intent	 of	 cross‐cultural	 recognition	 in	 order	 to	 explain	
the	attitudes	behind	 the	attacks,	partially	absolve	MSK	of	 individual	moral	 responsibility	 and,	
ultimately,	secure	a	more	lenient	sentence.	
	
In	his	 sentencing	 judgment	of	2006,	 Justice	Hidden	gave	serious	consideration	 to	 the	cultural	
factors	 raised	 by	 Professor	 Humphrey’s	 anthropological	 evidence	 about	 NWFP.	 His	 Honour	
noted	 the	 Crown’s	 objection	 to	 the	 Professor’s	 evidence	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 generality:	 ‘He	 [the	
Crown]	accepted	that	 the	Professor	was	qualified	 to	speak	of	 the	social	mores	of	 the	relevant	
area	of	Pakistan	but	noted	that	he	had	never	interviewed	the	offender	and	was	unaware	of	his	
upbringing’	 (Regina	 v	MSK,	 Regina	 v	MAK,	 Regina	 v	MMK	 [2006]	 NSWSC	 237	 at	 36).	 Justice	
Hidden	remarked:	
	
The	argument	that	a	cultural	background	such	as	that	disclosed	by	the	evidence	
in	 the	present	 case	might	bear	upon	 sentence	 for	 sexual	 assault	 is	 unpalatable,	
but	it	is	worthy	of	measured	consideration	(at	37).	
	
To	attempt	an	explanation	of	MSK’s	attitudes	towards	women,	his	refusal	to	take	responsibility	
for	 his	 offences,	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 he	 thought	 prosecution	 of	 his	 offences	was	 ludicrous	 (and	
therefore	 part	 of	 an	 anti‐Muslim	 conspiracy),	 Justice	 Hidden	 deferred	 again	 to	 Humphrey’s	
evidence:	
	
Professor	 Humphrey	 sketched	 briefly	 how	 men’s	 authority	 over	 women	 is	
reinforced	by	the	legal	system,	including	areas	of	the	criminal	law	which	make	it	
‘more	difficult	 for	women	 to	get	protection	against	domestic	violence,	 rape	and	
false	accusations	against	them’	(at	33).		
	
His	Honour’s	attention	to	these	factors	may	be	seen,	by	some,	as	laudable	for	its	receptiveness	
to	cultural	difference.	But	Justice	Hidden’s	reflections	also	signal	a	potential	cultural	blindness	
to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 very	 same	 issues	 around	 the	 prosecution	 of	 gendered	 violence	 still	 also	
plague	Western	criminal	justice	systems.	In	the	end,	Justice	Hidden	rejected	the	cultural	defence	
on	 the	 basis	 that	 MSK	 had	 been	 in	 Australia	 long	 enough	 to	 be	 habituated	 to	 its	 dominant	
cultural	 norms	 (thereby	 constructing	Australia	 as	 a	 non‐patriarchal	 society	where	 sexual	 and	
gendered	violence	does	not	 tend	 to	occur	 in	 similar	 circumstances);	but	he	did	not	 reject	 the	
defence	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 its	 generality	 or	 for	 its	 reliance	 on	 limited	 or	 overly	 simplified	
understandings	of	culture	and	cultural	difference.		
	
Moreover,	 Justice	 Hidden’s	 musings	 on	 MSK’s	 cultural	 background	 yield	 some	 interesting	
insights	into	the	way	Euro/Anglo‐centric	legal	discourses	–	usually	committed	to	liberal	ideas	of	
individual	 responsibility	 and	 freewill	 as	 exercised	 by	 rational	 men	 –	 appears	 to	 bestow	 or	
retrieve	individual	agency	from	accused	persons	who	are	viewed	as	culturally	‘Other’.	Here,	the	
ability	 to	 act	 as	 a	 rational	 free	 agent	 appears	 to	 be	 dependent	 on	whether	 an	 individual	 acts	
within	the	dominant	normative	cultural	framework,	an	invisible	culture	that	ostensibly	does	not	
influence	 its	 members	 to	 act	 in	 morally	 abhorrent	 ways	 that	 target	 vulnerable	 members	 of	
society.	To	the	extent	that	racially	 ‘unmarked’	 individuals	morally	transgress,	they	are	seen	to	
either	 choose	 their	 transgressions	 from	 established	 moral	 norms,	 or	 their	 actions	 are	
interpreted	as	the	result	of	 individual	pathologies.	The	inverse	appears	to	be	applied	by	some	
legal	actors	to	the	criminal	actions	of	cultural	Others.	Try	as	they	might,	the	criminal(ised)	Other	
cannot	 seem	 to	 escape	 the	 deterministic	 clutches	 of	 their	 cultural	 pathology;	 in	 such	
interpretations	the	actions	of	cultural	Others	are	driven	not	by	reason	and	free	will	but	by	an	
attachment	to	antiquated	traditions	of	gender	oppression	and	violence.		
	
Selda	Dagistanli:	In	Defence	of	Culture?	Racialised	Sexual	Violence	and	Agency	in	Legal	and	Judicial	Narratives 
	
IJCJ&SD								63	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com																						©	2015	4(3)	
Hence,	Hidden’s	 entertainment	 of	 the	 idea	 that	MSK’s	 culture	was	 responsible	 for	 his	 violent	
misogyny	was	only	outweighed	by	the	idea	that	he	must	by	now	be	sufficiently	enculturated	to	
be	 an	 individual	moral	 agent	 of	 the	 dominant	 culture	 and	 act	 on	 his	 own	 free	 will.	 In	 other	
words,	His	Honour	presumes	that	MSK	should,	after	a	few	years	in	Australia,	have	the	ability	to	
depart	 from	 the	 deterministic	 clutches	 of	 his	 cultural	 background	 that	 dictates	 highly	
patriarchal	 and	 misogynistic	 norms	 through	 which	 women	 are	 dehumanised.	 This	 sort	 of	
judicial	reasoning	operates	on	the	liberal	philosophy	that	underpins	law:	Kant’s	rational	moral	
agent	 ‘who	 is	 free	only	 insofar	 as	 he	 can	 act	 in	 accordance	with	 a	universal	 law	 that	 he,	 as	 a	
rational	 being,	 legislates	 to	 himself’	 (Benhabib	 2002:	 139).	 Outside	 the	 courtroom,	 in	 the	
domain	of	popular	media	and	conservative	political	 commentary	(which	 invariably	seeps	 into	
legal	 discourse),	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 an	 oscillation	 between	 the	 bestowal	 of	 individual	 and	
collective	 (cultural)	 responsibility.	 While	 deviant	 actions	 are	 attributed	 to	 culture,	 the	
possibility	 that	 this	 may	 serve	 as	 mitigation	 for	 criminal	 behaviour	 often	 results	 in	 calls	 for	
cultural	Others	to	be	treated	like	‘everyone	else’	and	punished	with	the	full	weight	of	the	law.		
	
Justice	Hidden’s	 approach	may	be	 contrasted	 to	 other	 judicial	 actors	 in	 the	K	brothers’	 cases	
who	 refused	 to	 consider	 arguments	 around	 cultural	 conditioning.	 In	 an	 earlier	 sentencing	
appeal	 at	 the	 end	of	 2005	against	 Justice	 Sully’s	 sentences,	 the	 expert	 testimony	of	 Professor	
Humphrey	 had	 not	 yet	 been	 made	 available	 by	 defence	 counsel.	 At	 that	 stage,	 the	 defence	
submissions	relied	simply	on	the	argument	that	MSK	held	‘very	traditional	views	about	women’	
because	of	his	cultural	conditioning	in	Pakistani	society	(Regina	v	MAK,	Regina	v	MSK,	Regina	v	
MMK	 [2005]	NSWCCA	369).	 Such	 submissions	were	 firmly	 rejected	by	 the	 Justices	McClellan,	
Grove	and	Hall	of	 the	NSWCCA	with	 Justice	McClellan	commenting	on	 their	vagueness.	 Justice	
Grove	concurred	with	McClelland	that	the	term	‘traditional	views	about	women’	was	too	vague,	
and	expressed	strong	views	about	the	inappropriateness	of	the	submissions:	
	
Whatever	 counsel	 implied	 by	 his	 expression	 ‘traditional	 views	 about	 women’,	
neither	is	there	to	be	extracted	some	element	of	mitigation.	If	it	was	intended	to	
suggest	 that	 differences	 might	 be	 observed	 in	 behaviour	 in	 the	 respective	
‘cultures’	of	Pakistan	and	Australia,	 there	was,	and	 is,	not	the	slightest	basis	 for	
concluding	other	than	that	in	both	places,	all	women	are	entitled	to	respect	and	
safety	 from	 sexual	 assault	 (Regina	v	MAK,	Regina	v	MSK,	Regina	v	MMK	 [2005]	
NSWCCA	369	at	61).	
	
Grove	added	that	‘the	expression	“cultural	time	bomb”	was,	to	say	the	least,	inappropriate	and	
inapt.	It	would	understandably	be	regarded	as	offensive	by	those	who	fell	within	the	scope	of	its	
insult’	 (at	 61).	 The	 views	 of	 these	 judges	 seem	 to	 remain	 faithful	 to	 the	 law’s	 privileging	 of	
individual	 responsibility	 and	 a	 steadfast	 refusal	 to	 surmise,	 as	 Justice	 Hidden	 did,	 on	 the	
presumably	deterministic	pull	of	MSK’s	cultural	background.		
	
In	an	earlier	trial	before	Justice	Sully	of	the	Supreme	Court,	cultural	defences	were	not	explicitly	
raised.	But	the	trial	certainly	did	not	lack	in	its	share	of	strong	understandings	about	culture;	if	
not	Pakistani	 culture,	 then	 ‘foreign’	 or	Other	 cultures	 in	 general.	 Aside	 from	 the	 commentary	
and	behaviours	of	the	brothers	and	their	families	that	were	upheld	by	popular	media	narratives	
as	 representative	 of	 Pakistani	 cultural	 norms,	 psychological	 assessment	 reports	 tendered	 as	
evidence,	also	featured	the	culture	of	the	offenders	–	in	terms	of	their	ethnicity	and	religion	–	as	
a	central	tenet	of	the	stories	told	in	court:		
	
An	accurate	knowledge	of	MSK’s	socio‐cultural	background	and	family	dynamics	
...	would	allow	for	a	better	understanding	of	the	offences.	In	this	context,	it	would	
be	 useful	 to	 know	 about	 any	 prevalent	 cultural	 assumptions	 and	 practices	
relating	 to	 females	 that	 they	may	have	absorbed	during	 their	 formative	years	–	
and	 in	 particular,	 cultural	 assumptions	 relating	 to	 young	 females	 who	 are	
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perceived	 to	be	sexually	available	 (Regina	v	MSK,	Regina	v	MAK,	Regina	v	MMK,	
Regina	v	MRK	[2004]	NSWSC	319,	Dr	Baron	at	61).		
	
But	for	their	reference	to	a	Pakistani	background	perpetrator,	this	assessment	might	be	applied	
to	 sex	 offenders	 from	 any	 ethnic	 background.	 Despite	 his	 consideration	 of	 such	 expert	
testimonies,	 Justice	 Sully’s	 sentencing	 remarks	 reject	 culture	as	an	excuse.	Yet	 Sully	explicitly	
accepts	that	the	cultural	attitudes	of	offenders	might	explain	why	sexual	violence	occurs:	
	
In	our	society	to	force	a	woman,	any	woman,	to	have	sexual	intercourse,	is	always	
and	 everywhere	 a	 base	 act	 and	 a	 major	 crime.	 It	 is	 not,	 ever	 or	 anywhere,	 a	
defence	 that	 the	 woman	 was	 flighty,	 flirtatious	 or	 simply	 foolish.	 That	 latter	
comment	 is	 especially	 to	 the	 point	 with	 boys	 and	 men	 from	 foreign	 ethnic	
cultures.	The	status	of	women	in	foreign	countries	is,	in	the	end,	a	matter	for	the	
law	and	culture	of	those	countries.	The	status	of	women	in	Australia	is	a	matter	
for	the	law	and	culture	of	Australia	(at	48	and	49).		
	
The	problem	with	Sully’s	assessment	is	not	that	he	accepts	that	cultural	attitudes	generate	the	
conditions	for	sexual	violence	to	occur	but	his	suggestion	that	such	cultural	attitudes	seem	to	be	
more	 prevalent	 within	 ‘foreign	 ethnic	 cultures’	 and	 not	 ‘our	 society’.	 His	 remark	 suggests	 a	
certain	 backwardness	 in	 respecting	 women’s	 rights	 associated	 with	 specific	 cultures	 that	 is	
apparently	not	at	all	applicable	to	Australia,	presenting	a	homogenous	view	of	both	Australian	
society	and	the	culture	of	‘foreign	countries’.	It	may	be	true	that	the	culture	of	NWFP	is	deeply	
patriarchal	and	that	gendered	violence	 is	rife	 in	 those	regions	(Perveen	2009).	 It	may	also	be	
true	that	the	majority	of	Australian	society	is	not	overtly	patriarchal	and	equality	for	women	has	
come	 far	 enough	 to	 generate	 deep	disapproval	 of	 sexual	 violence	 (even	 in	 those	 cases	where	
victims	have	been	traditionally	blamed).	Yet	the	fact	that	Sully	can	allude	to	the	possibility	that	
women	may	 invite	 sexual	 assault	 by	 being	 ‘flighty,	 flirtatious	 or	 simply	 foolish’	 –	 even	 if	 this	
does	not	constitute	a	defence	–	is	an	implicit	reference	to	dominant	cultural	norms	that	engage	
in	victim	blaming.		
	
American	 legal	 scholar	 Leti	 Volpp	 (2001)	 has	 suggested	 that	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 sexism	 of	 other	
cultures	obscures	the	extent	of	sexism	and	gendered	violence	in	the	dominant	culture.	While,	as	
Anne	 Phillips	 (2007)	 argues,	 it	 may	 not	 be	 tenable	 to	 suggest	 that	 all	 societies	 are	 equally	
patriarchal	or	 that	 some	societies	do	not	have	 a	more	 robust	 agenda	of	 equality	between	 the	
sexes,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 an	 agenda,	 however	 marginalised	 it	 might	 be	 in	 these	 Other	
societies,	simply	does	not	exist.		
	
Overall,	 Sully’s	 assumptions	 do	 not	 account	 for	 the	 heterogeneity	 of	 either	 Australian	 or	
Pakistani	 society;	 indeed	 none	 of	 the	 judicial	 commentary	 in	 the	 K	 brothers’	 trials	 explicitly	
acknowledge	 that	 there	 are	 some	 parts	 of	 Australian	 society	 (and	 other	 English‐speaking	
Western	societies)	that	are	exceedingly	sexist	and	amenable	to	trivialising	the	damage	of	sexual	
abuse,	just	as	there	are	some	quarters	of	NWFP	that	engage	in	daily	political	struggles	against	
the	oppression	of	women.	Some	recent	examples	of	sexual	violence	in	homosocial	 institutions	
such	 as	 the	 Australian	 Defence	 Force	 (Australian	 Human	 Rights	 Commission	 (AHRC)	 Report	
2012)	 (and	 other	 Defence	 Forces,	 for	 example,	 Fowler	 et	 al.’s	 (2003)	 Report	 of	 the	 Panel	 to	
Review	Sexual	Misconduct	Allegations	at	 the	U.S.	Air	Force	Academy),	 elite	Australian	 sporting	
teams	 (Cover	 2013;	 Flood	 2008;	 Philadelphoff‐Puren	 2004),	 the	 Catholic	 Church	
(Commonwealth	 of	 Australia	 (2014)	 Royal	 Commission	 into	 Institutional	 Responses	 to	 Child	
Sexual	Abuse)	and	college	 fraternities	 (Sanday	2007	 in	a	US	context)	have	been	the	subject	of	
heightened	 public	 and	 political	 attention	 and	 debate	 in	 an	 Australian	 and	 in	 other	 Western	
contexts.	 In	ways	unprecedented,	recent	discourse	has	at	times	moved	beyond	the	 ‘bad	apple’	
paradigm	 (see	 AHRC	 Report	 2012)	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 the	 intensely	 patriarchal	 cultures	 of	
such	institutions	propagate	the	systemic	misogyny	and	sexual	violence	that	has	been	endemic	–	
with	impunity	–	in	those	organisations	for	decades.		
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Yet	 there	 remains	 a	 significant	 difference	 between	 the	 stigma	 attached	 to	 the	 sexual	
transgressions	of	institutional	groups	on	the	one	hand	and	ethnic	cultural	groups	on	the	other.	
One	 notable	 difference	 is	 the	 perception	 that	 non‐Western	 ethnic	 cultural	 groups	 are	
intransigent,	 trapped	 in	 a	 pre‐modern	 moral	 universe	 and	 beyond	 positive	 change,	 while	
Western	institutional	cultures	are	smaller	in	scale,	retain	at	least	some	level	of	authority	(even	
after	 the	 exposure	 of	 repugnant	 practices)	 and	 are	 deemed	 capable	 of	 reform.	 Another	
distinction	 lies	 in	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 stigma	attached	 to	 institutional	 cultures	and	non‐Western	
ethnic	 cultures,	 with	 stigmatisation	 of	 the	 latter	 being	 more	 widespread,	 inescapable	 and	
personal	for	individuals	that	are	identified	by	the	visible	racial,	cultural	and	symbolic	markers	
associated	with	certain	ethnic,	cultural	and	religious	groups.		
	
‘My	Culture	made	me	do	it’:	Agency	and	responsibility	in	legal	cultural	scripts	
The	 legal	 subject	 as	 an	 autonomous,	 rational	 agent	 –	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 citizen	 subject	 of	
liberalism	 –	 is	 one	 that	 has	 long	 been	 contested	 by	 feminists	 of	 various	 persuasions.	 The	
primary	 objection	 of	 feminist	 scholars	 to	 liberal/legal	 personhood	 is	 the	 claim	 that	 its	
characteristics	are	inherently	masculine	and	that	women	and	‘the	feminine’	are	either	‘Othered’	
–	completely	sidelined	as	 legal	or	political	agents,	or	expected	to	conform	to	the	universalised	
masculine	status	quo	prescribed	by	law	(Naffine	1990;	Threadgold	1991).	Scholars	focusing	on	
diversity,	 structurally	 disadvantaged	 or	marginalised	 populations	 and	 a	 politics	 of	 difference	
have	 raised	 similar	 objections	 to	 the	 premises	 of	 sameness	 that	 animate	 concepts	 of	 liberal	
citizenship	(Razack	1999;	Sandel	1982;	Tully	1995;	Young	1990)	and	legal	personhood	(Naffine	
1990).	 In	 such	work,	 the	 insights	 of	 feminism	 centred	 on	 the	 exclusion	 of	women	 have	 been	
mobilised	to	criticise	the	exclusion	of	other	group	identities	through	universalised	liberal	claims	
to	citizenship	(and	similarly,	legal	subjectivity)	that	purport	to	be	neutral	but	are	based	on	the	
white,	 male,	 privileged	 and	 autonomous	 subject	 that	 is	 said	 to	 remain	 detached	 from	 the	
parochial	 and	 irrational	 demands	 of	 cultural	 and	 group	 identities.	 As	 Savell	 points	 out	 (with	
reference	to	Mykitiuk	1994),	‘the	legal	person	is	characterised	as	a	self‐sufficient,	self‐directing	
agent	whose	relations	with	others	are	antagonistic’	(2002:	31).3	Moreover,	critics	of	liberalism	
question	 the	 possibility	 of	 justice	 in	 a	 society	 based	 on	 a	 fiction	 of	 neutrality.	 For	 example,	
Sandel	maintains	that	 ‘all	political	orders	…	embody	some	values;	the	question	is	whose	values	
prevail	 and	 who	 gains	 and	 loses	 as	 a	 result	 …	 [T]he	 ideal	 of	 a	 society	 governed	 by	 neutral	
principles	 is	 liberalism’s	 false	 promise.	 It	 affirms	 individualistic	 values	while	 pretending	 to	 a	
neutrality	which	can	never	be	achieved’	(1982:	11,	emphasis	in	original).		
	
The	scholarship	critical	of	a	liberal	legal	system’s	obfuscation	of	the	gendered	and	raced	status	
quo	 often	 offers	 answers	 through	 an	 acknowledgment	 of	 the	 difference	 and	 differential	
circumstances	 of	 diverse	 and	 subordinated	 groups.	 As	 Phillips	 points	 out	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	
feminist	analysis:	 ‘In	the	framework	of	an	unequal	society,	 that	refusal	to	recognise	difference	
can	have	perverse	effects	…	 [it]	 can	become	a	covert	way	of	elevating	one	group	alone	as	 the	
norm.	Men	then	stand	in	for	humanity,	and	humanity	adopts	a	masculine	form’	(2002:	16).	The	
same	might	be	said	in	the	context	of	race	and	class	as	the	(male)	legal	subject	finds	its	origins	
within	 and	 is	 articulated	 from	 a	 certain	 structural	 standpoint	 that	 is	 presumed	 universal.	
According	to	Naffine,	the	legal	subject	is	‘the	white,	educated,	affluent	male…	[who]	evinces	the	
style	 of	 masculinity	 of	 the	 middle	 classes’	 (1990:	 100‐101)	 while	 Hudson	 points	 to	 ‘the	
dominant	 subjectivity	 …[as]	 object	 in	 that	 it	 is	 he	 whose	 behavior	 law	 has	 in	 mind	 when	 it	
constructs	its	proscriptions	and	remedies;	and	it	is	this	subject	who	constructs	the	law’	(2006:	
30).		
	
There	have	been	 two	key	approaches	 in	 recognising	difference	 to	avoid	uncritically	accepting	
the	 privileged	 (white,	 male,	 affluent)	 status	 of	 the	 legal	 person.	 One	 is	 the	 progressively	
intentioned	 cross‐cultural	 ‘recognition’	 approach	 that	 generally	 prevails	 in	 communitarian	
scholarship	and	 in	cultural	defences	 in	 law,	where	cultural	group	 identities	risk	being	seen	as	
homogenous	 while	 their	 practices	 are	 potentially	 seen	 as	 immutable	 and	 fixed.	 Another	
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approach	 goes	 in	 the	 opposite	 direction,	 seeking	 to	 avoid	 this	 fixed	 and	 essentialist	 view	 of	
culture	by	denying	the	existence	of	a	group	identity	at	all.	Stuart	Hall	takes	this	position	in	‘New	
Ethnicities’	when	he	states	that	 ‘the	 fully	unified,	completed,	secure	and	coherent	 identity	 is	a	
fantasy’	 (1992:	 277).	 Such	 views,	 taken	 to	 the	 extreme,	 deny	 the	 coherence	 of	 group	 and	
cultural	identities	and	may	even	disavow	the	labeling	of	cultural	groups.	As	a	result,	the	politics	
of	 difference	 ends	 up	 converging,	 somewhat,	 with	 the	 individualistic	 stance	 associated	 with	
liberalism,	 and	 encouraging,	 as	 Phillips	 argues,	 ‘an	 over‐individualised	 understanding	 of	
political	agency	that	attaches	too	little	weight	to	structural	difference’	(2002:	24).	Yet,	as	Phillips	
discusses:		
	
…	 the	 ‘ethnic	 minority’,	 like	 the	 ‘Aboriginal	 people’	 or	 ‘the	 lesbian	 and	 gay	
community’,	is	made	up	of	women	and	men,	old	and	young,	rich	and	poor:	people	
often	 engaged	 in	 conflict	 and	 disagreeing	 about	 the	 interpretation	 of	 their	
supposedly	shared	culture.	(2002:	24)	
	
Put	 differently,	 structural	 realities	 constrain	 the	 choices	 of	 individuals	 from	 ethnic	 minority	
groups	 in	 the	 same	ways	 as	 they	 do	 for	 individuals	 from	 any	 other	 group,	 but	 that	 does	 not	
mean	 that	 the	 moral	 and	 political	 agency	 to	 resist	 and	 contest	 objectionable	 and	 outmoded	
cultural	values	or	practices	is	simply	absent.		
	
Going	back	 to	 the	 legal	examples	presented	 in	 the	K	brothers’	cases,	 it	 is	clear	 that	 failures	to	
account	 for	 heterogeneity,	 difference	 and	 contestation	within	 cultures	 and	 cultural	 identities	
(rather	 than	 only	 between	 cultures)	 highlight	 two	 important	 points.	 Firstly,	 it	 is	 easy	 to	
pathologise	 and	 generalise	 about	 faraway	 cultures	 of	which	we	 know	 very	 little.	 Katha	 Pollit	
sums	this	up	very	nicely	in	her	rebuttal	of	Susan	Moller	Okin’s	infamous	question	about	whether	
multiculturalism	is	‘bad	for	women’	(1999).	Pollitt	asks:	
	
What	 is	 a	 culture	 and	 how	 do	 you	 know?	 A	 Chinese	 immigrant	 murders	 his	
supposedly	unfaithful	wife	and	says	this	is	the	way	we	do	things	back	home	...	The	
cultural	 rights	 argument	 works	 best	 for	 cultures	 that	 most	 Americans	 [or	
Australians]	know	comparatively	 little	about:	 cultures	 that	 in	 our	 ignorance	we	
can	 imagine	as	 stable,	 timeless,	 ancient,	 lacking	 in	 internal	 conflict,	premodern.	
(1999:	28‐29)	
	
Individuals	from	such	cultures,	by	virtue	of	their	difference,	are	attributed	a	group	rather	than	
individual	 identity.	 This	 ensures	 that	 the	 individual	 agency	 of	 Others	 is	 subordinated	 to	 the	
apparent	 responsibility	 of	 entire	 cultural	 groups	 for	 their	 individually	 (deviant)	 actions:	 ‘the	
individual	is	read	off	the	culture	and	the	culture	off	the	individual	in	turn’	(Phillips	2003:	516).	
Cultural	defence	then	becomes	a	move	to	diminish	the	subjectivity	of	individuals	‘from	minority	
cultural	groups	by	mis‐representing	their	cultures,	and	mis‐representing	the	individuals	as	less	
than	autonomous	beings’	(Phillips	2003:	517).		
	
The	second	point	is	that	culturally	inflected	cases	of	gendered	and	sexual	violence	demonstrate	
a	striking	intersection	of	gender	and	culture	in	which	men	and	women	of	visible	cultural	groups	
must	 conform	 to	 stereotypical,	 Orientalist	 understandings	 of	 gender	 performance	 in	 those	
cultures,	in	order	to	be	considered	as	authentic	cultural	Others	(Said	1978).	As	Phillips	(2003)	
says,	cultural	defences	that	are	 invoked	to	mitigate	violence	 in	criminal	cases	are	gendered	in	
ways	that	diminish	either	the	responsibility	of	defendants	or	 the	severity	of	their	actions.	The	
differential	 treatment	 of	men	 and	women	who	 are	 identified	 as	 culturally	 Other	 functions	 to	
reinforce	gender	stereotypes	attached	to	those	cultures,	while	maintaining	and	legitimating	the	
patriarchal	status	quo.		
	
Referencing	the	criminal	trials	of	women	who	had	claimed	‘honour’	as	a	reason	for	killing	their	
husbands	after	years	of	physical	and	sexual	abuse,	Phillips	(2003)	argues	that	women	of	Other	
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cultures	 must	 conform	 more	 stringently	 to	 cultural	 stereotypes	 of	 subservience	 in	 order	 to	
successfully	use	culture	as	a	potential	mitigating	factor.	Drawing	on	British	examples	of	murder	
cases	among	mostly	Pakistani	(‘Asian’)	women,	Phillips	observes:		
	
A	woman	portrayed	as	entirely	under	 the	control	of	male	 family	members	may	
draw	 on	 beliefs	 about	 non‐Western	 cultures	 to	 make	 a	 claim	 for	 diminished	
responsibility,	but	if	she	is	sullied	by	past	sexual	encounters	or	over‐qualified	by	
virtue	 of	 a	 degree,	 she	 no	 longer	 fits	 the	 prevailing	 image.	 There	 is	 little	 room	
here	for	the	complexity	of	most	people’s	lives,	and	we	are	left	with	a	rather	one‐
dimensional	and	static	representation	of	the	‘typical’	Asian	woman	(2003:	525).	
	
This	reference	to	the	‘typical	Asian	[Pakistani]	woman’	is	consistent	with	stereotypes	of	Muslim	
women	across	 the	Western	world,	echoing	also	 the	anthropological	portrayal	of	all	women	 in	
NWFP	as	 ‘legal	minors’	 (Odgers	2005)	 in	MSK’s	 sentencing	 appeal	 submissions.	 Interestingly,	
the	 stereotypes	 that	 abound	 around	 men	 and	 women	 of	 the	 dominant	 culture	 carry	 similar	
weight	in	legal	determinations	within	intimate	partner	homicide	and	provocation	cases	where	
culture	 is	 not	 specifically	 invoked	 (see	 Maher	 et	 al.	 2005).	 Such	 cases	 trade	 on	 either	 the	
diminished	 responsibility	 or	 otherwise	 of	 female	 defendants,	 and	 the	 perception	 of	 men	 as	
‘understandably	 incensed	by	 the	 sexual	waywardness	of	 “their”	women’	 (Phillips	2003:	530).	
This	leads	Phillips	to	conclude	that	the	culture	of	Others	is	accommodated	to	the	extent	that	it	
‘fits	 into	 familiar	 patterns	 …	 Culture	 operates	 on	 a	 terrain	 already	 defined	 by	 mainstream	
gender	 assumptions,	 and	 the	 gender	 inequities	 that	 have	 been	 associated	 with	 the	 cultural	
defence	need	to	be	understood	within	this	context’	(2003:	530‐531).		
	
Phillips’	 observations	 highlight	 the	 fact	 that	 cultural	 influence	 underpins	 individual	 violent	
transgressions	 across	 all	 cultures,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 the	 cultural	 backdrop	 is	 rendered	
invisible	through	its	taken‐for‐granted,	hegemonic	status,	or	highly	visible	in	its	Otherness.	It	is	
just	that	individual	agency	appears	to	either	be	conferred	or	taken	away	from	individuals	who	
come	 before	 the	 courts	 in	 line	 with	 their	 gender	 and	 cultural	 difference.	 In	 the	 examples	
outlined	in	this	paper,	a	dichotomous	approach	emerges	in	which	the	offenders	are	either	seen	
as	 individual	agents,	 fully	responsible	 for	 their	actions	because	 they	were	deemed	sufficiently	
versed	in	the	(non‐sexist)	norms	of	Australian	society,	or	they	were	irrational	dupes	who	were	
blindly	 conditioned	 by	 the	 dictates	 of	 a	 culture	 that	 remains	 timeless	 in	 its	 oppression	 of	
women.	While	the	successful	persuasion	of	the	courts	by	the	latter	argument	may	suit	racialised	
defendants	for	the	purposes	of	securing	a	more	lenient	sentence,	it	constitutes	a	denial	of	their	
subjectivity	 as	 free	 agents	 while	 entrenching	 damaging	 cultural	 stereotypes	 more	 widely.	
Dominant	 and	 reductive	 understandings	 of	 a	 cultural	 Other	 which	 are	 mobilised	 in	 law	 to	
explain	criminal	behaviours	reinforce	the	liberal/illiberal,	civilised/uncivilised	dichotomies	that	
characterise	 conservative	 arguments	 about	non‐white	 immigration,	 selective	multiculturalism	
and	anti‐Muslim	racism.		
	
It	 is	worth	also	 raising	questions	about	 the	 status	of	 defences	or	 assessments	on	 the	basis	of	
‘good	character’.	For	example,	how	is	an	offender’s	commitment	to	education	and	employment	
viewed	 by	 the	 courts	 and	 could	 these	 factors	 be	 seen	 as	 driven	 by	 culture?	 In	 one	 of	 the	
judgments	 relating	 to	 the	K	brothers’	 cases,	 Justice	Sully	 commented,	 in	his	 sentencing	of	 the	
youngest	 brother	 MRK,	 on	 ‘the	 promise	 shown	 by	 MRK	 in	 attaining	 his	 HSC	 [Higher	 School	
Certificate]	 in	 such	unpromising	 circumstances’	 (Sully	 2004	 at	 175).	 Since	MRK’s	 educational	
promise	 is	 not	 articulated	 as	 expressly	 ‘cultural’,	 it	 is	 presumably	 a	 byproduct	 of	 his	
enculturation	to	the	dominant	cultural	norm,	while	his	sexual	transgressions,	both	related	and	
unrelated	to	the	sexual	offences	in	which	he	took	part,	are	evidence	of	his	cultural	Otherness.		
	
The	 point	 is	 that	 all	 defences	 and	 character	 assessments	 are	 in	 fact	 informed	 by	 culture.	We	
cannot	 eliminate	 cultural	defences	or	 assessments	 from	 legal	discourse,	 even	 if	we	 label	 such	
defences	as	something	else.	In	addition,	removing	any	factors	of	mitigation	in	weighing	up	the	
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criminality	of	accused	persons	would	result	in	a	system	in	which	all	criminal	acts	would	attract	
the	 maximum	 possible	 penalty.	 While	 this	 paper	 has	 not	 sought	 to	 comment	 on	 whether	
maximum	penalties	should	be	imposed	on	all	sex	offenders	(or	indeed	anyone	who	perpetrates	
violence	against	vulnerable	groups),	 there	 is	 little	point	 in	eliminating	culture	as	a	potentially	
mitigating	 factor	when	 a	multitude	 of	 other	mitigating	 factors	 are	 raised	 in	 law	 that	 are	 not	
labelled	as	 ‘cultural’.	Whether	these	factors	are	raised	opportunistically	or	otherwise	is	beside	
the	point:	 factors	of	mitigation	must	be	 considered	 in	any	democratic	 justice	 system.	What	 is	
problematic	 is	 the	 way	 in	 which	 culture	 is	 exclusively	 associated	 with	 racialised	 individuals	
while	 failing	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 invisible	 hegemonic	 cultural	 backdrop	 that	 generates	 a	
dominant,	stereotypical	narrative	about	the	(negative)	norms	of	Other	cultures	and	the	degree	
of	influence	that	these	norms	purportedly	have	on	individuals	who	fall	within	their	scope.		
	
A	 more	 measured	 approach	 might	 be	 for	 legal	 and	 judicial	 narratives	 to	 acknowledge	 that	
people’s	 choices	 are	 both	 constrained	 and	 enabled	 by	 any	 cultural	 framework	 that	 affords	
differential	 power	 to	 individuals	 within	 different	 structural	 circumstances.	 Cultural	 attitudes	
are	 informed	by	 and	 filtered	 through	a	mix	of	many	different	 structural	 factors	 such	as	 class,	
gender,	age	and	disability.	Nobody,	whether	they	identify	with	a	minority	culture	or	not,	belongs	
to	one	discrete	culture	by	which	they	are	solely	influenced.	This	is	an	obvious	assertion	yet	it	is	
one	that	appears	to	elude	some	elements	of	legal	discourse,	even	where	judges	have	remarked,	
in	 these	 examples,	 on	 Australian	 culture	 (rather	 than	 not	mentioning	 it	 at	 all)	 in	 contrast	 to	
Other	cultures.	Those	who	identify	with	a	particular	ethnic	culture	lead	more	complex	lives	than	
that	 which	 is	 assumed	 in	 legal	 and	 political	 discourses.	 Individuals	 identifying	 with	 foreign	
cultural	 norms	 are	 not	 automatons	 blindly	 following	 cultural	 norms	 that	 are	 unchanging	 and	
trapped	in	time.	Individuals	from	ethnic	minority	groups	may	remain	attached	to	their	cultural	
identities	while,	to	quote	Phillips	again,	‘simultaneously	challenging	the	external	disparagement	
of	“their”	culture	or	community	and	the	internal	representations	of	that	culture	or	community	
that	reproduce	inequalities	and	injustices’	(2002:	24).		
	
Furthermore,	cultural	identities	and	practices	are	more	fluid	and	dialogic	in	their	development	
rather	 than	 fixed	 or	 solid.	 Benhabib	 stresses	 a	 ‘narrative	 view	 of	 identity	 [which]	 regards	
individual	as	well	as	collective	identities	as	woven	out	of	tales	and	fragments	belonging	both	to	
oneself	and	to	others’	(2002:	152).	She	argues,	drawing	on	a	concept	coined	by	Charles	Taylor,	
that	we	are	thrown	into	context	specific	‘webs	of	interlocution’	and	that	‘our	agency	consists	in	
our	capacity	to	weave	out	of	those	narratives	and	fragments	of	narratives	a	life	story	that	makes	
sense	for	us,	as	unique	individual	selves’	(Benhabib	2002:	146).	This	is	not	to	say	that	culture	
does	 not	 constrain	 or	 influence	 individual	 narratives	 and	 dialogues	 that	 create	 identities:	
‘Certainly,	the	codes	of	established	narratives	in	various	cultures	define	our	capacity	to	tell	the	
story	in	very	different	ways;	they	limit	our	freedom	to	“vary	the	code”’	(Benhabib	2002:	146).	
	
Returning	 to	 MSK	 as	 an	 example,	 his	 choices	 may	 be	 seen	 as	 influenced	 by	 a	 confluence	 of	
cultures;	 a	 patriarchal	 culture,	 whether	 that	 is	 the	 culture	 of	 his	 birthplace	 in	 NWFP	 or	 the	
culture	 of	 the	 society	 in	 which	 the	 attacks	 took	 place,	 or	 the	 misogynistic	 culture	 that	 was	
cultivated	between	himself	and	his	brothers	as	part	of	a	response	to	their	marginal	status	in	a	
new	country.	Regardless	of	the	numerous	structural	and	cultural	contexts	and	circumstances	in	
which	the	K	brothers’	misogynistic	attitudes	took	shape,	MSK	remains	individually	responsible	
for	 the	 sexual	 assaults.	 His	 misogyny	 was	 shaped	 through	 an	 interlocution	 with	 various	
patriarchal	normative	frameworks	on	a	micro	and	macro	scale,	while	his	choices	were	shaped	
and	influenced	through	the	intersection	of	a	specific	set	of	cultural	influences	that	came	to	bear	
on	his	actions.	This	applies	no	more	to	MSK	than	it	does	to	any	other	sex	offender	who	is	not	
identified	as	a	product	of	any	particular	culture.	
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A	different	narrative	on	difference?	
While	 there	 are	no	easy	 solutions	 that	might	 generate	a	more	nuanced	perception	of	 cultural	
difference	before	 the	courts,	 a	more	palatable	approach	 to	 cultural	defence	might	be	 taken	 in	
two	potential	ways.	First,	 a	more	 reflexive	approach	 to	 culture	might	need	 to	be	 taken	 in	 the	
commentary	 of	 judicial	 officers	 and	 other	 legal	 actors	 in	 sexual	 assault	 and	 other	 gendered	
violence	 cases.	 Granted	 that	 some	 cultural	 frameworks	may	 be	more	patriarchal	 than	others,	
legal	 narratives,	 sentencing	 judgments	 in	 particular	 (in	 which	 moralising	 commentary	 is	 de	
rigueur),	need	to	acknowledge	that	our	culture	as	much	as	any	other	generates	the	normative	
framework	for	sexual	and	other	violence	against	women	and	any	other	vulnerable	members	of	
society.	Such	judgments	also	need	to	acknowledge	that	the	culture	of	Others	is	as	heterogeneous	
as	the	culture	of	the	hegemonic	framework	from	which	the	law	operates,	and	that	the	 lives	of	
individuals	are	often	marked	by	similar	structural	constraints	and	struggles	within	any	cultural	
framework.		
	
Legal	 and	 judicial	 recognition	of	 the	 complexities	 that	mark	 individual	 lives	might	prompt	an	
important	 change	 in	 the	narratives	 that	pertain	 to	 cultural	Others.	Rather	 than	subordinating	
cultural	difference	to	an	invisible	and	hegemonic	cultural	norm,	this	type	of	recognition	would	
be	more	 amenable	 to	 understanding	 that	perpetrators	of	 sexual	 and	other	 gendered	 violence	
share	 a	 culture	 of	 misogyny	 that	 does	 not	 vary	 greatly	 between	 ethnicities	 and	 religious	
backgrounds.	 Here,	 legal	 judgments	 might	 perform	 an	 important	 pedagogical	 function.	 As	
Coates	et	al.	(1994:	189)	argue:		
	
Written	judgments	…	express	the	state	of	the	particular	law	at	any	given	time	…	
they	affect	not	only	the	litigants	but	also	the	future	shape	of	the	law	and	society	at	
large	 …	 Indeed	 a	 judge’s	 language	 may	 be	 drawn	 from	 counsel,	 witnesses,	
previous	judgments	or	broader	social	discourse.	It	is	this	public	discourse	…	that	
has	an	impact	and	is	acted	upon.	Language	affects	events	and	creates	versions	of	
reality.	
	
Another	suggestion	is	that	the	parties	to	any	gendered	violence	case	engage,	as	potential	‘expert	
witnesses’,	women	and	men	from	the	same	ethnic	groups	as	the	offenders	who	are	active	in	the	
struggle	for	a	more	robust	women’s	and	human	rights	agenda	in	their	own	countries.	The	same	
sort	 of	 agenda	 may	 be	 useful	 in	 relation	 to	 Indigenous	 cultural	 defence	 claims	 in	 cases	 of	
extreme	 violence	 against	women	 and	 children	 in	 remote	 Australian‐Indigenous	 communities.	
While	this	suggestion	might	attract	criticism	for	its	utopian	and	potentially	impractical	nature,	it	
seeks	 to	address	the	problem	of	minorities	within	minorities,	namely	women	and	children,	as	
being	 particularly	 disadvantaged	 by	 the	 claims	 of	 culture.	 It	 is	 also	 a	 way	 of	 giving	 voice	 to	
different	political	interests	within	the	cultures	of	Others	that	do	not	simply	and	homogenously	
subscribe	to	–	but	actively	struggle	against	–	the	patriarchal	majority.	Though	such	testimonies	
might	be	open	to	contestation	from	more	traditional	voices	within	those	cultures,	or	even	the	
voices	of	 ‘experts’	who	have	conducted	anthropological	research	into	the	cultures	 in	question,	
they	represent	not	only	the	humanitarian	aims	of	Others	–	which	Western	discourses	have	long	
claimed	 as	 their	 own	 (Bumiller	 2008)	 –	 but	 also	 the	mutability	 of	 cultural	 norms	 and	moral	
frameworks	that	characterise	any	ethno‐cultural	group.		
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1	Indeed,	Indigenous	cultural	defences	might	be	said	to	carry	even	more	weight	in	post‐colonial	settler	societies	than	
those	 that	 are	 mobilised	 in	 relation	 to	 ethnic	 minority	 groups	 (see	 Howe	 2009;	 Razack	 1994).	 However	 that	
discussion	lies	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.	
2	There	was	also	evidence	that	there	were	up	to	a	dozen	more	victims	than	the	four	that	came	forward	as	the	brothers	
had	videotaped	all	of	their	victims	in	a	non‐sexual	context	before	attacking	them.	
3	Despite	such	criticisms	of	 the	atomistic	and	universalised	 liberal	 individual	and	 the	hostility	 to	difference	 that	 is	
said	to	exist	in	liberal	scholarship	(see	for	example	Barry	2001)	some	liberal	theorists,	notably	Will	Kymlicka,	insist	
that	liberalism	properly	interpreted	‘is	sensitive	to	the	way	our	individual	lives	and	moral	deliberations	are	related	
to,	and	situated	in,	a	shared	social	context.	The	individualism	that	underlies	liberalism	isn’t	valued	at	the	expense	of	
our	 social	 nature	 or	 our	 shared	 community.	 It	 is	 an	 individualism	 that	 accords	 with,	 rather	 than	 opposes,	 the	
undeniable	importance	to	us	of	our	social	world’	(Kymlicka	1989:	2‐3).	
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